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Abstract: What happens when a defendant receives defective counsel during plea-
bargaining, but subsequently receives a fair trial?  This Note discusses 
three different approaches: no remedy, specific performance of the plea 
bargain, and a retrial.  I argue that specific performance of the plea bargain 
violates various judicial and constitutional principles, while ordering no 
remedy at all relies on a flawed understanding of the Sixth Amendment.  
This Note introduces the notion that ineffective assistance of counsel 
during plea-bargaining is a structural-error in the criminal process, rather 
than a trial-error.  I conclude that the only workable solution is to order a 
new trial. 
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A bank is robbed and the police accuse two brothers of the heist.  The older brother is 
arrested for the robbery itself, while his younger brother is arrested for aiding and abetting.  They 
are charged separately, and they each hire their own attorney.  Given the mountain of evidence 
against them, they are both eager to begin plea negotiations, and the state offers both brothers the 
same deal: 10 years, if they plead guilty to their respective charges. 
 
The younger brother’s attorney erroneously advises his client that he faces a maximum 
sentence of 15 years for aiding and abetting a bank robbery, five more than the plea offer, if he is 
found guilty at trial.  Pursuant to his attorney’s advice, the younger brother accepts the offer, 
pleads guilty, and waives his right to trial, when in fact, 10 years is the maximum sentence the 
younger brother faced for aiding and abetting the robber.  But for the attorney’s deficient 
counsel, the younger brother would have proceeded to trial and risked nothing.  Had he been 
convicted he would have received a sentence no worse than the plea bargain. 
 
The older brother’s counsel is also deficient, but in a different way.  His attorney 
misreads the relevant criminal statute and advises his client that 10 years is the maximum 
sentence that the older brother faces for bank robbery.  Therefore, this brother rejects the offer, 
pleads innocent, and proceeds to trial where he found guilty.  In reality the older brother faced a 
maximum sentence exposure of 25 years for the bank robbery.  Pursuant to his conviction, he is 
given the maximum sentence – more than double the original plea offer.  But for the attorney’s 
deficient counsel, the older brother would have accepted the offer of 10 years, pled guilty, and 
waived his right to trial.  Instead, he risked 15 additional years in prison for a slim chance at 
acquittal. 




Both brothers immediately challenge their convictions based on ineffective assistance of 
counsel, since each attorney committed an inexcusable error when calculating their respective 
clients’ sentence exposures.  But what is the remedy for each?  The younger brother’s remedy is 
clear: he waived his right to trial because of defective counsel, and so a court would simply 
vacate his conviction and restore his rights by ordering a new trial.1  But what about his older 
brother?  Although the older brother also received ineffective assistance of counsel during plea 
bargaining, he already received a fair trial.  Ordering a new trial to replace the fair proceeding 
that just took place appears both inappropriate and redundant.  But then, how else should a court 
remedy the older brother’s ineffective assistance of counsel, if at all?   
This Article discusses the proper remedy for a criminal defendant who, as a result of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, rejects a favorable plea bargain, proceeds to trial, and 
ultimately receives a higher sentence than the plea.   
 
Usually when a defendant receives ineffective assistance of counsel during plea-
bargaining, he pleads guilty, waiving his right to trial.  There are, however, occasions where a 
defendant proceeds to trial when in reality his best option would have been to plead guilty 
pursuant to a plea arrangement.2  Does a defendant suffer a remedial prejudice if he is denied 
effective assistance of counsel during plea-bargaining but subsequently receives a fair trial?  
Courts have answered this question in three ways.  The first two find that the defendant does 
suffer prejudice and therefore deserves a remedy: one orders another trial,3 while the second 
                                                 
1 See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970). 
2 Commonwealth v. Napper, 254 Pa.Super. 54, 60 (1978) (Effective counsel “is most often needed to convince the 
client to plead guilty in a case where a not guilty plea would be totally destructive.”). 
3 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Napper, 254 Pa.Super. 54 (1978) (vacating the conviction and ordering a new trial). 
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orders specific performance of the plea bargain.4  Unlike the first two, the third approach finds 
no prejudice, orders no remedy, and simply affirms the conviction and sentence.5  Various courts 
on the state and federal levels have adopted each path.  In 2008 the United States Supreme Court 
was set to finally decide this question in Arave v. Hoffman,6 before both parties withdrew the 
case.7  Given its interest to resolve this nationwide split, the Supreme Court will likely answer 
this question soon.  This piece seeks inform that decision. 
 
Unfortunately, despite the extensive and conflicting case law, along with the Supreme 
Court’s demonstrated interest, academic literature has not kept pace.  To close this gap, I begin 
by discussing the three paths in turn, and the case law associated with each.  An aggregate 
discussion like this will be the first of its kind, and should more fully ground the reader.  For 
instance, by focusing on those jurisdictions that have ordered a new trial, one finds that there are 
some states that have ordered a new trial without discussion,8 and there are some that have fully 
explained their reasoning.9  Several federal court decisions have played out the same way.10  But 
although these cases have applied identical remedies, they have not followed the same line of 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Turner v. Tennessee, 858 F.2d 1201, 1208 (6th Cir. 1988) (reinstating plea bargain is the only way to 
neutralize the constitutional harm). 
5 See, e.g., State v. Taccetta, 975 A.2d 928 (N.J. 2009). 
6 128 S.Ct. 532 (2008). 
7 After the Court granted certiorari, but before oral argument, defendant filed an unopposed motion to vacate the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision and dismiss the case.  Defendant decided to abandon his claim for ineffective assistance 
during plea-bargaining and no longer sought the relief ordered by the Ninth Circuit.  To avoid any possibility of 
receiving the death penalty, both sides agreed to proceed with the resentencing ordered by the district court. The 
Court, in a per curiam opinion, granted Hoffman's motion and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit with the 
instructions that the district court should dismiss the ineffective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining claim 
with prejudice.  Arave v. Hoffman, 552 U.S. __ (2008) (per curiam). 
8 Dew v. State, 843 N.E.2d 556 (Ind. 2006) (ordering a new trial if state does not reinstate the original plea offer); 
State v. Williams, 83 S.W.3d 371 (Tex. 2002) (failing to inform defendant of plea bargain offer was defective 
assistance, warranting a new trial); In the Matter of Cready, 100 Wash.App. 259 (2000) (granting new trial where 
defense counsel failed to inform defendant he would serve mandatory minimum terms totaling ten years); Larson v. 
State, 104 Nev. 691 (1988). 
9 People v. Curry, 178 Ill.2d 509 (1997). 
10 Wanatee v. Ault. 259 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2001) (granting writ of habeas corpus to defendant who was denied 
effective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining); United States v. Gordon, 156 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 1998); 
Turner v. Tennessee, 858 F.2d 1201 (6th Cir. 1988) (vacating conviction and remanding back to plea negotiations). 
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argument.  The same goes for courts that have ordered specific performance of the plea 
bargain,11 and for those that have ordered no remedy at all.12  I begin by discussing the difficulty 
of determining prejudice and the “no remedy” approach.  In Part III, I outline those decisions that 
favor specific performance of the plea.  Finally, in Part IV-A I examine those decisions that have 
ordered a retrial.  
 
The conflicting judicial decisions discussed in this review demonstrate that none of these 
approaches is perfect.  Decisions that order no remedy ignore process so long as the “correct 
result” is achieved.  Although specific performance of the plea offer is the most intuitive remedy, 
it is also the most complex since expired deals are sometimes impossible to resurrect because of 
changed circumstances.  Even if the deal is still available, it is unclear whether a member of the 
judicial branch can order a member of the executive branch to reoffer a deal without violating the 
separation of powers.  The new trial remedy is redundant, and risks awarding the defendant a 
windfall chance at acquittal, which would be completely disproportionate to the harm alleged.  
This Article is unique in that it finally brings these divergent opinions together to compare their 
strengths and weaknesses.  A review like this does not exist in the literature today.  
 
However, this Article does not just describe the ongoing judicial conversation, it also 
adds to it by offering a new approach.  In Parts IV-B and C, I respond to the leading cases that 
support granting no remedy.  This rebuttal is unique in two ways.  First, several arguments found 
in the no-remedy section have never been directly answered, either in judicial opinions or 
academic articles.13  Second, I introduce an entirely new argument: the courts that find no 
                                                 
11 United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1468 (9th Cir. 1994). 
12 State v. Taccetta, 195 N.J. 513 (2008); State v. Greuber, 165 P.3d 1185 (Utah 2007). 
13 For example, I respond to an argument found in State v. Greuber, that prejudice cannot occur because defendants 
do not have a right to a plea bargain.  165 P.3d at 1190.  This argument misstates the question.  The right lost here is 
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prejudice because the ensuing trial was “fair,” obscure the dichotomy between trial-errors and 
structural errors.14  This type of error is structural because it defies analysis by traditional 
harmless error standards and affects “the framework within which the trial proceeds,”15 or even 
“whether it proceeds at all.”16  
In many ways, this Article is long overdue: no one has written on this topic for the last 
seventeen years, no piece reviews the nationwide judicial split in the aggregate, and no 
publication concludes that only a new trial remedy is appropriate.  Moreover, to date no judicial 
opinion or law review article has explicitly advanced the notion that ineffective assistance of 
counsel during plea-bargaining is a structural error, rather than a trial error.17  By doing so, this 
Article gives attention to a relatively neglected area of the law, while making several unique 
contributions to the literature on ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 
The last scholarly article to discuss this topic is a student Note from 1992, published in 
the California Western Law Review.18  The author concludes that defendants do suffer prejudice 
in these cases, and that the only appropriate remedy is to order specific performance of the plea 
                                                                                                                                                             
not the right to a plea bargain as such, but rather the right to counsel’s assistance in making a decision after a plea 
bargain has already been put on the table.  See Part V-A.  I also respond to State v. Taccetta, which advances a rather 
powerful argument that since the defendant claimed innocence, he could not have pled guilty pursuant to the plea 
bargain without committing perjury.  975 A.2d at 935-36.  Relying upon existing Supreme Court case law, the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and practical concerns regarding the plea bargain process, I argue that this rule 
is unworkable and unfair.  See Part V-B. 
14 United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150-51 (2006). 
15 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991). 
16 United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S 140, 150 (2006). 
17 Justice Scalia comes close in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,  
 
Many counseled decisions, including those involving plea bargains and cooperation with the 
government, do not even concern the conduct of the trial at all.  Harmless-error analysis in such a 
context would be a speculative inquiry into what might have occurred in an alternate universe. 
 
548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006). 
18 Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 28 Cal. W. L. Rev. 431 (1992). 
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bargain.19  Unfortunately, that piece would not help a court resolve this issue today, since it does 
not discuss federal and state case law since 1992.20  Second, it concludes that specific 
performance of the plea bargain is appropriate without addressing other constitutional principles 
that remedy implicates, such as double jeopardy,21 the abstention principle,22 and the separation 
of powers.23  Since structural errors must be automatically reversed, and given the logistical 
hurdles involved in reinstating the original plea, I conclude that the only workable solution is to 
order a new trial. 
 
 
A- Overview on the Right to Counsel 
 
When considering claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, state and federal courts must 
adhere to the standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington, which require that defense counsel 
perform in such a way as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process.24  To succeed 
on a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy both 
prongs of the Strickland test.  First, the defendant must demonstrate that defense counsel’s 
performance was objectively and unreasonably deficient.25  Second, a defendant must then show 
that the deficient performance was prejudicial in some way.26  Attorneys are human and 
invariably will make mistakes; so the Court in Strickland made clear that errors, “even if 
                                                 
19 Id. at 458. 
20 See, e.g., Wanatee v. Ault. 259 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Gordon, 156 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 1998); 
Dew v. State, 843 N.E.2d 556 (Ind. 2006); State v. Williams, 83 S.W.3d 371 (Tex. 2002); In the Matter of Cready, 
100 Wash.App. 259 (2000). 
21 See, e.g., Mahar, 809 N.E.2d at 1003 (noting that the defendant was acquitted of charged found in the plea 
arrangement, making it “legally impossible to resurrect and impose the previously rejected plea agreement”). 
22 Since most of these cases originate in state court, permitting federal courts to order specific performance could 
implicate federalism concerns, such as the abstention principle.  See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 424 (1979); 
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 49 (1971). 
23 See State v. Eckelkamp, 133 S.W.3d 72 (Mo.App. E.D. 2004) (finding court lacked authority to mandate that 
prosecutor engage in plea negotiations). 
24 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
25 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. 
26 Id. at 693. 
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professionally unreasonable,” do not warrant setting aside a judgment if the error had no effect 
on the disposition of the case.27  Even constitutional deficiencies must be prejudicial in order to 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.28  To determine 
prejudice, a court asks whether there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding 
would have been different, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors; if so, the deficiency is 
prejudicial.29  Remedies for the deprivation of the right to counsel “should be tailored to the 
injury suffered from the constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on 
competing interests.”30 
 
B- The Right to Counsel during Plea Bargaining 
 
It is rather axiomatic that the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel attaches during every critical 
stage of the prosecution after adversarial proceedings have begun.31  Plea-bargaining is one such 
critical stage, not only because it is “an essential component of the administration of justice,”32 
but also because ninety-five per-cent of convictions end in plea bargains.33  In 1970, the Supreme 
Court held that a defendant could challenge a guilty plea based on deficient counsel if that advice 
was “not within the range of competence” required of criminal defense attorneys.34  Later, in Hill 
v. Lockhart, a case decided the year after Strickland, the Supreme Court directly applied the 
                                                 
27 Id. at 691-92. 
28 Id. at 692. 
29 Id. at 694. 
30 United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981). 
31 Adversarial proceedings begin once the criminal defendant appears before a magistrate judge where he learns of 
the charges against him, and where his liberty is subject to restriction.  Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S.Ct. 2578 
(2008). 
32 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).  See also State v. Simmons, 65 N.C.App. 294, 299 (1983) 
(noting the same). 
33 Jenny Roberts, Too Little, Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to Investigate, and Pretrial 
Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1136 (2004) (“About ninety-five percent of criminal 
cases end not with trials, but in plea bargains.”). 
34 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970).  See also Julian v. Bartley, 495 F.3d 487, 494-95 (7th Cir. 
2007) (discussing Strickland’s origins). 
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Strickland test to legal assistance during plea negotiations.35  Indeed, this principle has been 
widely adopted on both the federal and state levels to apply where  
(1) defense counsel fails to disclose a plea offer to the defendant,36  
(2) defendant is erroneously advised to plead guilty,37 and  
(3) defendant is erroneously advised to plead innocent.38 
 
Often, the most difficult question is whether the defendant’s counsel was ineffective, while the 
easiest is how to remedy the deficiency.  When a defendant, pursuant to his attorney’s advice, 
enters a guilty plea as part of a negotiated deal with the government, he waives his right to trial 
and the “full panoply” of other constitutional rights that come with it.  If the attorney’s advice 
was ineffective, the guilty plea is vacated, the process is reset, and these rights are fully 
restored.39  In fact, not a single court or jurisdiction disagrees with this remedy.  The answer is 
not as clear when the defendant is erroneously advised to plead innocent and, in doing so, 
proceeds to trial where s/he does receive the “full panoply” of constitutional protections.  The 
next section discusses the difficulties of determining prejudice if a defendant received a fair trial.  
 
 
II.  NO HARM, NO FOUL, NO REMEDY: THE CASE AGAINST PREJUDICE 
 
                                                 
35 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). 
36 See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 929 F.2d 747, 752-753 (1st Cir. 1991); Johnson v. Duckworth, 793 F.2d 
898, 902 (7th Cir. 1986); United States ex rel. Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435, 438 (3d Cir. 1982); State v. 
Simmons, 65 N.C.App. 294, 300 (1983); People v. Ferguson, 90 Ill.App.3d 416 (1980); Loyd v. State, 258 Ga. 645, 
647 (1988); Lyles v. State, 178 Ind.App. 398, 401 (1978); People v. Whitfield, 40 Ill.2d 308, 239 N.E.2d 850 Ill. 
(1968). 
37 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). 
38 Julian v. Bartley, 495 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39 (3d Cir. 1992); Toro v. 
Fairman, 940 F.2d 1065, 1067 (7th Cir. 1991); Lewandowski v. Makel, 949 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1991); Turner v. 
Tennessee, 858 F.2d 1201, 1205 (6th Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S. 902 (1989); Beckham v. 
Wainwright, 639 F.2d 262, 265-66 (5th Cir. 1981); People v. Blommaert, 237 Ill.App.3d 811 (1992); Judge v. State 
of South Carolina, 321 S.C. 554, 558-60 (1996); In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal.4th 924, 934 (1992); Williams v. State, 326 
Md. 367 (1992); Larson v. State, 104 Nev. 691 (1988); Commonwealth v. Napper, 254 Pa.Super. 54 (1978). 
39 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). 
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A growing number of courts have held that a defendant who rejects a plea-bargain to go to trial, 
and is ultimately convicted and sentenced, suffers no prejudice as a result of defective counsel 
during plea-bargaining.40  Accordingly, since these jurisdictions find no prejudice, they provide 
no remedy for the defendant, and simply affirm the conviction and sentence.   
 
A. The Difficulties of Determining Prejudice  
 
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the right to counsel “has been accorded . . . 
not for its own sake, but for the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial.”41  
It is axiomatic that a trial is not unfair, and thus the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel is not 
implicated, if the defendant is not prejudiced in some way.42  A prejudicial error deprives the 
defendant of a substantive or procedural right to which the law entitles him.43  Since a defendant 
has no substantive or procedural right to a plea bargain,44 this argument supposes that as a matter 
of law, a defendant cannot claim prejudice by ineffective assistance of counsel during plea-
bargaining if he ultimately receives a fair trial.45 
 
For instance, in the case of In re Alvernaz, the California Supreme Court grappled with 
the difficulty of determining prejudice.46  First, the court noted that if a defense attorney’s simply 
miscalculates the sentence, this error could not, without more, give rise to a claim of ineffective 
                                                 
40 State v. Taccetta, 195 N.J. 513 (2008); State v. Greuber, 165 P.3d 1185 (Utah 2007); Bryan v. State, 134 S.W.2d 
795 (Mo. App. 2004); State v. Monroe, 757 So.2d 895 (La. App. 2000).  See also Commonwealth v. Mahar, 809 
N.E.2d 989 (Mass. 2004) (Sosman, J., concurring); Garcia v. State, 736 So.2d 89 (Fla. App. 1999) (Gross, J., 
concurring); Rasmussen v. States, 658 S.W.2d 867 (Ark. 1983) (Adkisson, C.J., dissenting). 
41 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 (2002), quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984). 
42 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). 
43 Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). 
44 Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984); State v. Monroe, 757 So.2d 895 (2000). 
45 See Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 368-70 (holding that unfairness or unreliability do not result unless counsel’s deficiency 
deprives defendant of a substantive or procedural right to which the law entitles him, not merely that the outcome 
would have been different).  
46 830 P.2d 747 (1992). 
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assistance of counsel.47  For the Alvernaz Court, the defendant has to show that he would have 
accepted the plea bargain to establish prejudice.  However, a “self-serving statement” to that 
effect, after the fact, was insufficient evidence.48  In this case, the court found that the 
defendant’s “decision to reject the plea offer was motivated primarily by a persistent, strong, and 
informed hope for exoneration at trial, and that any evaluation of precise sentencing options was 
secondary in his thinking.”49 
 
Obligating the defendant to demonstrate that s/he would have actually accepted the offer, 
but for counsel’s ineffective assistance, serves another purpose, wholly separate from prejudice: 
since a conviction-by-trial almost always results in a sentence greater than a procedural 
conviction, defendants have plenty of incentive to later claim ineffective assistance of counsel, 
whether or not the claim has merit.  Of course, assisted by hindsight, which allows a complete 
comparison between going to trial and accepting the offer, a defendant can assure the court that 
he would have chosen the latter rather than risk trial.  These “buyer’s remorse” claims are easily 
made, and by their nature completely dependent on after-the-fact testimony by an all-too-
interested party: the defendant.50  The Alvernaz court focused on the defendant’s own stance at 
trial where “protestations, under oath, of complete innocence [detracted] from the credibility of a 
hindsight claim that a rejected plea bargain would have been accepted had a single variable 
(sentencing advice) been different.”51  Other courts have agreed.52  It is hard to draw lines 
                                                 
47 Id. at 757. 
48 Id.  See also Lloyd v. State, 373 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1988) (holding that the evidence failed to establish that defendant 
would have accepted the offer had she been properly counseled). 
49 Alvernaz, 830 P.2d at 761. 
50 In the matter of McCready, 996 P.2d 658, 662 (Wash.App. 2000) (Brown, J., dissenting). 
51 Id. at 757. 
52 See Rasmussen v. Arkansas, 658 S.W.2d 867 (Ark. 1983) (refusing to set aside conviction or order new trial since 
defendant did not allege that she would have accepted plea, or that she would not accept it); People v. Carmichael, 
179 P.3d 47 (Col. App. 2007) (construing defendant’s statements as self-serving and insufficient to establish 
prejudice under Strickland). 
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between where the defendant’s decision calculus relied upon the counsel’s erroneous advice, and 
where it relied upon a calculated risk to stand trial.  Courts struggle to determine what actually 
caused the defendant to reject the favorable plea arrangement: strategy or deficient counsel.53 
 
The soundness of an attorney’s analysis concerning the likely 
outcome of trial and sentencing – an analysis involving “layers of 
judgment and a highly uncertain element of prognostication,” – is 
extremely difficult to measure, and the perfection of hindsight 
must not be allowed to influence that measurement.54 
 
 
In addition to proving that the defendant would have accepted the plea, some courts also 
require the defendant to establish a probability that the trial judge would have approved the 
arrangement.55  Since a plea bargain is worthless until the court accepts it, “[j]udicial approval is 
an essential condition precedent to any plea bargain.”56  In Mabry v. Johnson the prosecution 
withdrew a plea offer after the defendant had accepted it but before the trial judge had approved 
it.57  The Supreme Court held that until a plea bargain “is embodied in the judgment of a court, 
[its removal] does not deprive an accused of liberty or any other constitutionally protected 
interest.”58 
 
Therefore, according to this line of reasoning, before determining prejudice a court 
should consider first, whether a defendant has shown that he would have accepted the offer, and 
                                                 
53 See, e.g., McCready, 996 P.2d at 661 (Brown, J., dissenting) (arguing that defendant pursued a strategy of 
acquittal under a self-defense theory, and rejected a plea offer that would have fixed his sentence at less than any 
sentence he understood as likely to be imposed if convictd). 
54 Commonwealth v. Mahar, 809 N.E.2d at 999 (Sosman, J., concurring). 
55 Alvernaz, 830 P.2d at 758. 
56 People v. Stringham, 206 Cal.App.3d 184, 194 (1988). 
57 467 U.S. 504 (1984). 
58 Mabry, 467 U.S. at 507.  See also Bryan v. State, 134 S.W.3d 795, 803 (2004) (“The law is clear that negotiations 
which do not result in a guilty plea, and a resultant embodiment of that plea in the court’s judgments, do not 
implicate any constitutionally-protected rights or liberty interests.”). 
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second, whether the court would have approved the offer.59  Any past declarations of innocence 
may make these two hurdles insurmountable, since they undermine the credibility of any 
hindsight claim that the defendant would have accepted the offer.  Additionally, these claims 
decrease the probability that the court would have accepted a guilty plea, since a defendant 
cannot plead guilty to a crime he claims he did not commit.60 
 
B- The Leading “No Remedy” Decisions: State v. Greuber and State v. Taccetta 
 
Several courts have chafed at the idea of providing a defendant, convicted after one fair 
trial, an entirely new one.61  Recently, two state supreme courts took up the issue and rejected the 
argument that a defendant is prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel during plea-
bargaining if he later receives a fair trial.  Both decisions, one by the Utah Supreme Court in 
2007, and the other by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 2009, refused to offer any remedy 
whatsoever.  To date, these are the highest judicial authorities that have actually explained their 
reasoning when reaching such a conclusion, and so it is worth discussing each in turn. 
 
In State v. Greuber, the state charged the defendant with murder and aggravated 
kidnapping.62  During the initial stages of the trial preparation the state offered to drop the 
aggravated kidnapping charges in exchange for a guilty plea to murder.63  Greuber’s defense 
attorneys advised him to reject the plea offer, mistakenly believing that the only confession on 
                                                 
59 See People v. Carmichael, 179 P.3d 47, 52 (2007) (requiring both). 
60 State v. Ball, 381 N.J.Super. 545, 554 (2005). 
61 See e.g., State v. Bryan, 134 S.W.3d 795, 803-04 (2004) (rejecting a new trial remedy because “[o]ne fair trial is 
all the Constitution requires”); State v. Monroe, 757 So.2d 895, 898 (La.App. 2000) (“The only purpose of the new 
trial in this case would be to allow the defendant to change his plea from not guilty to guilty.  But there is no point in 
doing that when the defendant has already been found guilty.”). 
62 165 P.3d 1185 (Utah 2007). 
63 Greuber, 165 P.3d at 1186-87. 
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the record was a jailhouse informant.64  But had the attorneys reviewed the evidence, they would 
have discovered that Greuber himself confessed to the crime on tape, and thus their trial strategy 
was doomed to fail.65  After sentencing, the defendant appealed his conviction on the grounds 
that he would have accepted the plea bargain offer had his attorneys listened to the tape and 
competently advised him.66  The Utah Supreme Court denied any relief.  First, the court argued 
that effective assistance of counsel is meant to protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial, not a 
defendant’s right to a plea bargain.67  Unless the challenged conduct had some effect on the trial 
process itself, it could not have implicated the Sixth Amendment.68  Having established this 
requisite, the court then said,  
   
Thus, while Greuber did possess the right to effective assistance of 
counsel during the plea process, he could not ultimately have been 
prejudiced in this case because he received a trial that was fair – 
the fundamental right that the Sixth Amendment is designed to 
protect.  Nothing in the counsels’ pretrial conduct suggests “that 
the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”69 
 
 
The court pointed out that ineffective assistance of counsel must deprive a defendant of some 
“substantive or procedural right.”70  But since there is no substantive or procedural right to a plea 
bargain, the defendant merely lost an opportunity – an opportunity which may present itself to 
some defendants but not to others.71 
 
When the Supreme Court has applied the Sixth Amendment right 
to the plea process, it has considered whether an accepted guilty 
                                                 
64 Id. at 1187. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Greuber, 165 P.3d at 1188. 
68 Id. at 1188-89. 
69 Id. at 1189 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686). 
70 Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 373. 
71 Greuber, 165 P.3d at 1190. 
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plea has prejudiced the defendant, and not how the right applies 
when a defendant rejects a plea and proceeds with a fair trial.”72 
 
 
The Utah court also pointed out the difficulty in fashioning a remedy, even if it were to 
find prejudice.  When a defendant is mistakenly led to plead guilty, the remedy is simple: vacate 
the plea, and give the defendant the trial he never had.73  But the Greuber Court pointed out that 
after a defendant has received his constitutionally guaranteed fair trial, it is impossible to recreate 
“the balance of risks and incentives on both sides that existed prior to trial.”74  No remedy could 
resuscitate the original opportunity to plead guilty. Reinstating the plea would violate the 
doctrine of separation of powers, while “a new trial does not remedy the lost opportunity to 
plead.”75  Especially since ordering a new trial may be a “thinly veiled attempt to force the 
prosecution to reinstate the initial offer.”76  But most disconcerting, if enough time has elapsed, 
and the evidence and witnesses are no longer available, a new trial may result in a windfall 
acquittal, a completely disproportionate remedy to the alleged harm.77 
 
For the Utah Supreme Court, the difficulty in fashioning a remedy for those defendants 
that opt for trial, in comparison to those who mistakenly waive their right to trial, illustrated why 
the two types of defendants should not be treated identically.  Ultimately, the decision boiled 
down to a simple syllogism: although the Sixth Amendment applies during plea bargaining, the 
                                                 
72 Id. at 1188 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1985)). 
73 Id. at 1190. 
74 Id. (quoting Mahar, 809 N.E.2d at 1001 (Sosman, J., concurring)). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. (citing In re Alvernaz, 830 P.2d 747, 760 (9th Cir. 1992). 
77 Greuber, 165 P.3d at 1190-91 (quoting Mahar, 809 N.E.2d at 1002-03 (Sosman, J., concurring)).  See also Boria 
v. Keane, 99 F.3d 492, 499 (2d Cir. 1996) (no assurance that witness necessary for prosecution would still be 
available); State v. Bryan, 134 S.W.3d 795, 803-04 (2004) (rejecting a new trial remedy because “[o]ne fair trial is 
all the Constitution requires”); Id. at 804 (granting the defendant a new trial would reward a defendant for rejecting 
a plea offer to stand trial by “allowing him to escape the consequences of that decision”). 
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guarantee is ultimately grounded in the right to a fair trial; therefore, a defendant can only suffer 
prejudice if he accepts a plea and waives his trial, not if he rejects his plea and receives a trial.78 
 
In July 2009, the New Jersey Supreme Court became the latest jurisdiction to hold that a 
defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice for ineffective assistance of counsel during plea-
bargaining if he subsequently receives a fair trial.79  In State v. Taccetta the defendant rejected a 
plea offer he would otherwise have accepted because his attorney misinformed him about the 
sentencing consequences that would follow if he were found guilty of certain crimes in the 
indictment.80  After over a decade of appeals, a unanimous court found that, as a matter of law, 
the defendant’s own proclamations of innocence prevented him from truthfully pleading guilty 
pursuant to the State’s offer, since “[t]he notion that a defendant can enter a plea of guilty, while 
maintaining his innocence, is foreign to our state jurisprudence.”81  The New Jersey Supreme 
Court went on to say that a trial court cannot be complicit in a defendant’s plan to commit 
perjury, and an appeals court cannot vacate a jury verdict following a fair trial on the ground that 
the defendant would have lied under oath to accept a plea arrangement.82  The law requires that a 
judge be satisfied from the “lips of the defendant” that he committed the crime before accepting 
a guilty plea.83 
 
For most courts, when determining whether the defendant has demonstrated prejudice, 
the question has always been whether the defendant would have pled guilty.  But in Taccetta the 
question was whether the defendant could have pled guilty.  Ultimately the Taccetta decision 
                                                 
78 Greuber. 165 P.d3d at 1189. 
79 State v. Taccetta, 975 A.2d 928 (N.J. 2009). 
80 Id. at 929. 
81 Id. at 935-936. 
82 Id. at 936. 
83 Id. at 935 (quoting State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145, 155 (2009)). 
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boiled down to a rather unique, albeit intuitive, syllogism: when a defendant claims that he is 
innocent, he cannot later plead guilty pursuant to a plea arrangement, because doing so would be 
perjury, and a court cannot accept perjured testimony. 
 
 
C- Reinstating the Plea Is Often Impossible, and Violates Several Constitutional 
Principles 
 
Traditionally, specific performance of a plea offer has only been available where the prosecution 
has abused its discretion,84 or when the prosecution reneges on an accepted plea agreement.85  
Otherwise, there are difficult logistical issues involved when courts decide to reinstate the plea 
bargain.  For instance, since most of these cases originate in state court, permitting federal courts 
to order specific performance could implicate federalism concerns, such as the abstention 
principle, which generally bars federal interference with state criminal proceedings.86 
 
Even if a court determined with precision that the defendant would have accepted the 
offer, and that the trial court would have approved the offer, the notion that the judiciary can 
order a prosecutor – a member of the executive branch – to re-offer the plea, implicates concerns 
about the separation of powers.  In Greuber v. State, the Utah Supreme Court decided that under 
the separation of powers doctrine, courts do not have the power to require the prosecution to 
reoffer a plea bargain, especially since it would often entail dismissing charges.87  Additionally, 
forcing the prosecution to reoffer a plea bargain that it initially offered to avoid the expense and 
risk of a trial they have already won, would violate the basic fairness principles enshrined in the 
                                                 
84 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). 
85 Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 510 n.11 (1984). 
86 Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 424 (1979); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 49 (1971). 
87 Greuber v. State, 165 P.3d 1185, 1190 (2007) (“Under the doctrine of separation of powers, we do not believe 
courts have the power, in the absence of prosecutorial misconduct, to require the prosecution to dismiss charges, as 
would often be necessary to enact the earlier rejected plea.”).   
 Deal or No Deal?  Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Counsel during Plea Bargaining 
 
18
separation of powers doctrine.88  Other courts have decided that they could remand the case for 
retrial, but have no power to require the government to reinstate the rejected plea offer.89  Even 
assuming the court vacates the conviction, the prosecution could simply refuse to offer the same 
deal again, or refuse to engage in plea bargaining negotiations at all.90 
 
Forcing the government to re-offer the plea becomes even more difficult when significant 
time has elapsed.  This remedy would fail to take into account the changed circumstances of both 
parties since the original offer was made, which would interfere with established prosecutorial 
discretion.  After conducting a trial and obtaining a conviction, the prosecutor may now believe 
that the public’s interest is disserved by the original plea offer.91  A lot can happen between the 
time the original offer was made and the conclusion of an arduous post-conviction appeals 
process.  The prosecutor “should not be locked into the proposed pretrial disposition, appropriate 
as it may have been at the time.”92  Not to mention that sentencing decisions are usually made on 
the trial level; ordering specific performance of a plea bargain, especially one that was not yet 
approved by the trial judge, would prevent the trial court from exercising its traditional 
sentencing discretion.93 
 
Certain changed conditions may also make the original plea irretrievable under the 
Constitution’s double jeopardy clause, which forbids a defendant from being prosecuted twice 
                                                 
88 Greuber, 165 P.3d at 1190 (“Further, requiring the state to reoffer after trial a plea bargain it may have made 
originally to avoid the expense and risk of a trial violates separation of powers and basic fairness principles.”). 
89 See State v. Eckelkamp, 133 S.W.3d 72 (Mo.App. E.D. 2004) (finding court lacked authority to mandate that 
prosecutor engage in plea negotiations). 
90 Bryan v. State, 134 S.W.3d 795, 804 (Mo.App. S.D. 2004). 
91 See Alvernaz, 830 P.2d at 759. 
92 Id. 
93 People v. Calloway, 631 P.2d 30 (Cal. 1981) (ordering specific performance is inappropriate because it prevents 
trial court from exercising sentencing discretion). 
 Deal or No Deal?  Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Counsel during Plea Bargaining 
 
19
for the same crime if he has already been found innocent.94  For instance, imagine a scenario 
where the defendant is indicted for both felonious possession of a firearm and also aggravated 
manslaughter.  The initial plea offer stipulates that if the defendant pleads guilty to the firearm 
offense, the state will drop the manslaughter charge.  Instead, the defendant turns down the plea, 
goes to trial, where he is convicted of aggravated manslaughter, but is found innocent of the 
firearms charge.  The prohibition against double jeopardy would then prevent the defendant from 
pleading guilty to felonious possession of a firearm, a charge for which he has been declared 
innocent.  The plea, at this point, would be impossible to resurrect.95  Presumably, this same 
argument applies to the new trial remedy: the defendant could not be retried on any elements for 
which he was already found innocent, so a new trial remedy may not include all the charges of 
the original trial.96 
 The case against any remedy whatsoever is very strong.  In the next section I outline a 




III. THE CASE FOR REINSTATING THE PLEA  
 
Some courts believe that ordering another trial can never adequately remedy the constitutional 
deficiency.97  Instead these courts opt to reinstate the original offer, thereby putting the defendant 
in the position he was in prior to the Sixth Amendment violation.98  Since the Supreme Court has 
held that specific performance of a plea agreement may be a constitutionally permissible remedy 
                                                 
94 U.S. const., amend. V (“[No person shall] be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb.”). 
95 See, e.g., Mahar, 809 N.E.2d at 1003 (noting that the defendant was acquitted of charged found in the plea 
arrangement, making it “legally impossible to resurrect and impose the previously rejected plea agreement”). 
96 Id. 
97 State v. Kraus, 397 N.W.2d 671, 674 (Iowa 1986).  Accord United States ex rel. Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435, 
438 (3d Cir. 1982). 
98 United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1468 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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in certain contexts,99 some lower courts have embraced it to neutralize this particular 
constitutional deprivation.100 
 
The remedy can be applied in one of two ways.  On the one hand, courts may order the 
defendant to accept the offer, and mandate that the trial court resentence the defendant 
accordingly.  On the other hand, the court may simply require the government to re-offer the 
plea, giving the defendant the chance to reconsider, to make a counter-offer, or in theory, to 
reject it and receive another trial.  If the defendant does reject the plea, the latter scenario 
functionally becomes a corollary of the “new trial” remedy, with the only difference being that 
the state has to re-offer the plea before eventually re-trying the case.  Even amongst the courts 
that favor this remedy, there is no consensus about how to apply it.  That is, whether the plea 
should be pushed through by judicial fiat, or whether the defendant should simply be given the 
opportunity to reconsider it (and possibly re-reject it), but this time with effective assistance of 
counsel.  This section will discuss both applications of this particular remedy. 
 
A- Reinstating the Plea, with No Option for a New Trial 
 
Several state courts have concluded that in these situations a defendant suffers prejudice, but that 
since the prejudice did not affect the fairness of the trial, the defendant should instead be given a 
choice: plead guilty in accordance with the plea agreement, or accept the outcome of the trial.  In 
Williams v. State, the Maryland Court of Appeals decided that a defendant was prejudiced by 
ineffective assistance of counsel where his attorney failed to advise him of a possible mandatory 
                                                 
99 Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 510 n.11 (1984); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263 (1971).  See also 
State v. Rosario, 391 N.J.Super. 1 (2007) (holding that defendant who plea guilty in New York pursuant to bi-state 
disposition was entitled to enforcement of New Jersey’s prosecutor’s plea offer). 
100 See Turner v. Tennessee, 858 F.2d 1201, 1208 (6th Cir. 1988). 
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sentence.101  However, the court observed, the most the defendant could have done, had he 
received adequate counsel, would have been to accept the plea offer.  Therefore, “[g]iving him 
that opportunity now will place him in the same position he would have been in but for the 
incompetence.”102  Accordingly, the court gave the defendant the choice between the original 
convictions and sentence, or to plead guilty pursuant to the plea arrangement, but refused to 
order a new trial.  At least two other states have followed a similar model.103  The Williams court 
did not address the separation of powers doctrine when it ordered specific performance of the 
plea-bargain. 
 
Most of these decisions involve fairly straightforward comparisons between the length of 
sentence after trial and the proffered sentence in the plea bargain.  But in Hoffman v. Arave the 
defendant was charged with first-degree murder, and five weeks before trial the State offered 
him a rather unique plea bargain: if he were to plead guilty, the State would not pursue the death 
penalty.104  Defense counsel advised against accepting the plea based on an inaccurate reading of 
capital-punishment law,105 causing the defendant to reject the offer and proceed to trial, where he 
was convicted and ultimately sentenced to death.106  On appeal the Ninth Circuit held that the 
defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel was prejudicial for two reasons: not only was 
counsel’s reasoning flawed, but the defendant’s chance of receiving the death penalty was not 
minimal, which made counsel’s mistake all the more “disastrous.”107  After finding prejudice, the 
                                                 
101 326 Md. 367, 381 (1991). 
102 Id. at 382-83. 
103 See, e.g., Becton v. Hun, 205 W.Va. 139 (1999) (remanding for resentencing in conformance with plea offer); 
Iowa v. Kraus, 397 N.W.2d 671 (Iowa 1986) (holding that defendant is not entitled to a new trial, but would be 
allowed opportunity to enter plea pursuant to rejected plea-bargain). 
104 455 F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir. 2006). 
105 Defense counsel thought that it was only a matter of time before Idaho’s capital punishment scheme would be 
declared unconstitutional.  Hoffman, 455 F.3d at 929. 
106 Id. at 930-32. 
107 Id. at 941-43. 
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panel decided that the proper remedy would be to reinstate the plea offer with “the same material 
terms” as the original offer, rather than order a new trial.108 
 
The Sixth Circuit has also rejected retrial as an “inappropriate remedy for a defendant 
who had constitutionally deficient counsel during the plea negotiation process.”109  Like the 
Hoffman decision, the Sixth Circuit gave the prosecution the choice between releasing the 
defendant or re-offering a plea-bargain.110  None of these decisions, however, address the 
Greuber decision’s observations that specific performance of the plea bargain violates other 




B- Reinstating the Plea, With the Option for a New Trial 
 
Not all courts agree that forcing the prosecution to re-offer the plea means that the defendant 
must then accept it.  Acknowledging the difficulty of ordering specific performance, some courts 
order reinstatement of the plea bargain but mandate that the defendant is entitled to a new trial if, 
for whatever reason, the plea bargain does not go through.  This approach is particularly 
favorable to the defendant, who is not only guaranteed the opportunity to reconsider the original 
plea arrangement, but can also leverage the possibility of another trial to negotiate an even better 
offer. 
 
Several state courts have adopted this remedy.  For instance, in Dew v. State the Indiana 
Court of Appeals reversed a defendant’s convictions after finding that his counsel’s performance 
during plea negotiations was prejudicial.  To remedy the constitutional deficiency, the court 
                                                 
108 Id. at 942.  See also United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1468 (9th Cir. 1994); Nunes, 350 F.3d at 1057. 
109 Magana v. Hofbauer, 263 F.3d 542, 553 (6th Cir. 2001).   
110 Id. 
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ordered the state to either renew its plea offer or retry the entire case, which would reset the 
proceedings back to the plea-bargaining stage.111  In a similar case the following year, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court vacated the defendant’s conviction and ordered that he accept the 
original plea agreement, and be resentenced according to those terms.112   However, echoing 
Indiana, the Minnesota court made clear that if the plea arrangement does not go through, either 
because the trial court rejects it or because “the state, based on valid reasons, objects to specific 
performance,” the defendant would be entitled to a new trial.113  Florida has followed a similar 
path.114   Unfortunately, none of these decisions discussed the logistical and constitutional 
obstacles to specific performance of the plea bargain. 
 
Although the Hoffman decision, which gave the prosecution the choice between 
reoffering the plea bargain or releasing the defendant, is written as if it were entirely consistent 
with Ninth Circuit precedent, that circuit had previously decided that the appropriate remedy 
may be either the modification of the judgment so that it is consistent with the terms of the plea 
bargain, or a new trial that resets the plea bargaining process – a choice left open to the 
prosecution.115  The Faustian choice presented to the prosecution in Hoffman, between offering 
an expired plea bargain or releasing a defendant who has already been tried and convicted, was a 
new development in the law.116 
 
                                                 
111 843 N.E.2d 556, 571 (Ind. 2006). 
112 Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 542 (2007). 
113 Id. 
114 See, e.g., Beckham v. Wainwright, 639 F.2d 262 (C.A. Fla.1981) (ordering that defendant either be resentenced 
according to the plea offer, or be awarded a new trial). 
115 United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458 (9th Cir. 1994). 
116 Id. 
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The next section discusses an option that avoids the logistical hurdles of reinstating the plea 





IV.  TURNING BACK THE CLOCK: ONLY A RETRIAL CAN REMEDY THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEFICIENCY, WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY BALANCING THE INTERESTS OF BOTH THE 
DEFENDANT AND THE PROSECUTOR 
 
Remedies for ineffective assistance of counsel “should be tailored to the injury suffered 
from the constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing 
interests.”117  Those competing interests include society’s interest in the administration of 
criminal justice.118  Ultimately the only appropriate remedy for this type of constitutional error is 
to vacate the conviction and sentence, and order a new trial.  In this section I will first discuss the 
leading state and federal decisions that order a retrial, and their justifications for doing so.  In 
Part IV-B, I respond to the “no prejudice, no remedy” approach embraced by the Greuber and 
Taccetta courts, and demonstrate why the retrial remedy best balances the interest of the 
prosecution and defendant, while avoiding conflict with other constitutional principles.  Finally, 
in Part IV-C, I introduce the notion that this error is not a trial error, but rather a structural error 
in the criminal process, which requires an automatic reversal. 
 
A. State and Federal Decisions That Have Embraced the Retrial Remedy 
 
                                                 
117 United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981). 
118 Morrison, 449 U.S. at 364. 
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In Commonwealth v. Napper, one of the first cases of ineffective assistance of counsel 
during plea-bargaining, the defendant had been indicted on two counts of aggravated robbery.119  
The prosecutor offered up to three years for both charges, but defense counsel did not advise the 
defendant as to the relative merits of the offer compared to the defendant’s chances at acquittal – 
which were weak – if he proceeded to trial.120  The defendant followed his attorney’s advice and 
opted for trial.  A jury convicted him, and the judge sentenced him to two consecutive terms of 
five to twenty years.121  Before concluding that trial counsel was ineffective, the appellate court 
asked, “whether the action or strategy that counsel decided against or neglected had arguable 
merit.”122  The court saw the plea offer as a bargain, especially since the indictment risked a 
sentence of up to forty years – which is what the defendant ultimately received.123  A central 
tenet of the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel is that “defense counsel has a duty to 
communicate to his client, not only the terms of a plea bargain offer, but also . . . the defendant’s 
chances at trial.”124  The court went on to say, 
 
The decision whether to plead guilty or contest a criminal charge is 
probably the most important single decision in any criminal case. . 
. . But counsel may and must give the client the benefit of his 
professional advice . . . to convince the client that one course or the 
other is in the client’s best interest.  Such persuasion is most often 
needed to convince the client to plead guilty in a case where a not 
guilty plea would be totally destructive.125 
 
 
The Napper court acknowledged several uncertainties, such as whether the defendant 
would have accepted the offer, and whether the trial court would have approved the offer.  The 
                                                 
119 254 Pa.Super. 54 (1978). 
120 Napper, 254 Pa.Super at 56. 
121 Id. at 55. 
122 Id. at 56-57. 
123 Id. at 57. The court also found significant that the evidence against the defendant was overwhelming.  Id. at 57-
59. 
124 Id. at 60. 
125 Id. at 60. 
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latter is especially troublesome in cases like these since the trial court has always imposed a 
sentence that is much higher than the rejected plea offer.  Despite these uncertainties the Napper 
court concluded that the deficiency was prejudicial because the defendant might have accepted 
the offered bargain.126  As for whether the court would have rejected the offer, “as a practical 
matter . . . this rarely occurs.”127  Having concluded that the deficiency was prejudicial, the 
discussion shifted to what remedy would cure this prejudice.  The court recognized that any 
remedy would be imperfect: the court could neither compel the state prosecutor to reinstate the 
plea bargain offer, nor could it craft its own sentence.128  Left with no other choice, the court 
vacated the conviction and ordered a retrial where the defendant would be granted a new 
opportunity to engage in plea bargain discussions – this time, with competent counsel.129 
 
During the 1990s two more states decided that the proper remedy for ineffective 
assistance of counsel during plea-bargaining is a new trial.  In State v. Lentowski, the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals considered a defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where his 
attorney improperly advised him to reject a plea in order to pursue a mistaken defense.130  The 
court in Lentowski acknowledged that ordering a new trial is an imperfect remedy: returning the 
parties to the pretrial stage cannot completely recreate the conditions present before the 
constitutional violation occurred.  Nevertheless, the remedy struck an appropriate balance 
between the interests of the prosecution and the criminal defendant.  On the one hand, the 
                                                 
126 Napper, 254 Pa.Super. at 61.  See also State v. Hallman, 309 S.E.2d 493 (N.C.App. 1983) (“We, therefore, hold 
that a failure to inform a client of a plea bargain offer constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel absent extenuating 
circumstances.”). 
127 Id. 
128 Napper, 254 Pa.Super. at 61 (“Finally, it should be noted that our decision gives appellant only imperfect relief.  
We cannot compel the Commonwealth to reinstate it plea bargain offer; nor can we dictate what sentence may be 
imposed if appellant pleads guilty without so advantageous an offer as he had before, or if he goes to trial and is 
again convicted.”). 
129 Id. 
130 212 Wis.2d 849 (1997). 
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prosecution arguably has increased its bargaining power after having obtained a conviction.  On 
the other hand, the defendant regains the leverage afforded by a prosecutor’s desire to avoid 
another costly and uncertain trial, where the pressure to secure another conviction would be 
tremendous.131  While ordering specific performance of the plea arrangement implicates 
concerns regarding federalism, the separation of powers, and double jeopardy, by ordering a 
retrial, the decision whether to make the same offer or any offer at all is left to the prosecutor, 
thereby avoiding conflicts with two of those principles: federalism and the separation of 
powers.132  Additionally, since any retrial would necessarily have to exclude those charges for 
which the defendant was already declared innocent, this remedy would not infringe upon a 
defendant’s protection against double jeopardy.  As a result, the Lentowski court concluded that 
only a new trial remedy could balance the interests of the prosecution and defendant, while 
avoiding conflict with other constitutional principles. 
 
A few months later, in People v. Curry, the Illinois Supreme Court decided a similar 
case.133  The defendant in Curry did not claim that his attorney failed to disclose the State’s plea 
bargain; instead he claimed that he would have accepted the offer and avoided trial had he 
received effective assistance of counsel.134  Specifically, the defendant demonstrated that during 
plea negotiations his attorney did not know that the defendant faced mandatory consecutive 
sentencing, a fact that would have changed the calculus about whether to risk trial.135  The court 
decided that the defense counsel was inadequate by being “entirely unaware” of the maximum 
                                                 
131 Lentowski, 569 N.W.2d at 762. 
132 Lentowski, 569 N.W.2d at 762. 
133 178 Ill.2d 509 (1997). 
134 Curry, 687 N.E.2d at 882. 
135 Id. at 883. 
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sentence exposure the defendant faced.136  The court next considered whether the deficient 
counsel prejudiced the defendant.  The state made two arguments against a finding of prejudice.  
First, it argued that even if defense counsel’s advice was inadequate, the defendant suffered no 
prejudice because he did not have a substantive or procedural right to the plea bargain he 
rejected.137  The court rejected this argument, and instead reframed the issue to be about whether 
a defendant deserves adequate counsel to consider a plea that has already been offered: 
 
It is true that a defendant has no constitutional right to be offered 
the opportunity to plea bargain.  However, in this case, the State 
did engage in plea bargaining with defendant.  Thus, what is at 
issue here is whether, having received a plea offer from the State, 
defense counsel’s deficient performance deprived defendant of his 
right to be reasonably informed as to the direct consequences of 
accepting or rejecting that offer.138 
 
 
Second, the state argued that the defendant should also prove that the trial judge would 
have accepted the plea bargain offer in order to demonstrate prejudice.139  The court declined to 
impose this requirement, however, noting that it would be at odds with the realities of the plea 
bargain process, not to mention unwise to require litigants to speculate about how a particular 
judge would have acted.140   
Having established ineffective assistance of counsel and prejudice, the court then shifted 
its discussion to the proper remedy.  The court acknowledged that the defendant was not 
deprived of a fair trial, so another trial could not truly remedy the situation because the 
                                                 
136 Id. at 887. 
137 Id. at 888. 
138 Id. at 888. 
139 The State pointed out that a trial judge is not bound by the terms of a plea bargain agreement, and may in fact 
issue a different sentence.  Id. at 889. 
140 Id. at 890.  See also Turner v. Tennessee, 858 F.2d 1201, 1207 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[W]e do not believe that 
[defendant] was required to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the trial court would have approved the two-
year plea arrangement.”). 
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constitutional deprivation occurred during plea-bargaining.141  But after agreeing that specific 
performance of the plea agreement would not be a proper remedy, the court concluded that a 
retrial is the remedy best tailored to the constitutional injury.142  Many other states have also 
ordered a new trial to remedy ineffective assistance of counsel during plea-bargaining,143 often 
without further discussion.144 
 
Several federal court decisions have played out the same way.  In 1988 the Sixth Circuit 
considered an appeal from a habeas petitioner, James Turner, who claimed he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel in deciding to reject a two-year plea offer and go to trial.145  The 
trial resulted in a conviction and a sentence of life imprisonment plus forty years.  Both sides 
agreed that the right to effective assistance of counsel extends to the decision to reject a plea 
offer and proceed to trial.146  However, the State argued that Turner had not been prejudiced 
because he could not show that, but for the incompetent advice, he would have accepted the 
offer, or that the trial court would have approved the arrangement.147  The Turner court agreed 
that the defendant had to demonstrate a “reasonable probability” that he would have accepted the 
offer, but decided that in this case the defendant had done so.148  But the court rejected the 
State’s argument that a defendant must also demonstrate that the trial court would have approved 
the arrangement; instead, the court shifted this burden onto the State, to demonstrate 
                                                 
141 Curry, 687 N.E.2d at 890. 
142 The court opinion did not explain why specific performance of the plea bargain is inappropriate. Id. 
143 In the Matter of Cready, 100 Wash.App. 259 (2000) (granting new trial where defense counsel failed to inform 
defendant he would serve mandatory minimum terms totaling ten years); State v. Williams, 83 S.W.3d 371 (Tex. 
2002) (failing to inform defendant of plea bargain offer was defective assistance, warranting a new trial); Dew v. 
State, 843 N.E.2d 556 (Ind. 2006) (ordering a new trial if state does not reinstate the original plea offer). 
144 Larson v. State, 766 P.2d 261 (Nev. 1988); Commonwealth v. Copeland, 381 Pa.Super. 382 (1988) (awarding 
new trial if defendant proves ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to tell him of a plea offer); State v. Ludwig 
124 Wis.2d 600 (1985) (same); Hanzelka v. State, 682 S.W.2d 385 (Tex.App. 1984) (same); State v. Hallman, 309 
S.E.2d 493 (N.C.App. 1983).  
145 Turner v. Tennessee, 858 F.2d 1201 (6th Cir. 1988). 
146 Turner, 858 F.2d at 1206. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
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otherwise.149  Having established prejudice, the court then discussed the proper remedy, 
ultimately granting the equivalent of a new trial, although the court did not couch the remedy in 
those terms.   
In its remedy discussion, the court began by stating that granting Mr. Turner a new trial 
could not adequately remedy the deprivation: the rejected plea offer of two years was so unlike 
the sentence – life imprisonment plus forty years – that there was no chance that one more fair 
trial could revive the lost chance.150  Since a prosecutor would never reoffer a two-year bargain 
after having secured a sixty-year sentence, the court reasoned that ordering a new trial may not 
be adequate.  But the court also acknowledged “on the other hand, [that] requiring specific 
performance of the original two-year plea arrangement might unnecessarily infringe on the 
competing interests of the State.”151  The court decided that “the only way to neutralize the 
constitutional deprivation” would be to allow the defendant “to consider the State’s two-year 
plea offer with effective assistance of counsel.”152  Nevertheless, since the defendant did not 
have to accept this offer, and since the State could withdraw the offer upon showing the 
withdrawal was not the product of prosecutorial vindictiveness, this remedy functionally returned 
the parties to the plea bargaining stage, before trial.153  Although increasing the probability that 
both sides would agree to the original two-year plea offer, the court effectively restarted the trial 
process. 
Most recently, in Julian v. Bartley, the Seventh Circuit considered a habeas petitioner’s 
claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during plea-bargaining.154  The 
                                                 
149 Id. at 1207. 
150 Id. at 1208. 
151 Id. at 1208-09. 
152 Id. at 1208. 
153 Id. at 1209. 
154 495 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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defendant’s attorney misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey,155 
and mistakenly believed that the defendant faced a maximum thirty year sentence.  As a result, 
counsel advised defendant to reject the State’s plea offer of twenty-three years, and to proceed to 
trial.  However, contrary to his attorney’s advice, the defendant faced a sixty-year sentence by 
going to trial, and after conviction received a forty-year sentence.156  The court decided that 
defense counsel’s advice about a thirty-year maximum was “clearly wrong and therefore 
objectively unreasonable.”157  The court concluded that this error was clearly prejudicial because 
the defendant believed he was risking seven years by going to trial, when actually he was risking 
thirty-seven years.158 
 The court rejected specific performance of the plea bargain as an inappropriate remedy 
because the State had no hand in denying the defendant his right to effective assistance of 
counsel.159  Moreover, since the defendant never actually accepted the plea bargain, he had no 
absolute right to the offer now.160  As a result, the court granted the defendant a new trial.161 
Several other circuits have agreed that only a new trial adequately solves the contitutional 
deprivation, while respecting other competing interests.162 
 
B.  The Greuber and Taccetta Decisions Rely on a Flawed Understanding of the Sixth 
Amendment Right to Counsel  
 
                                                 
155 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
156 Bartley, 495 F.3d at 489-90. 
157 Id. at 495. 
158 Id. at 499. 
159 Id. at 500. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. Although the court made clear that it did not believe this remedy would be appropriate in all cases, the two 
conditions the decision cites as reasons to reject specific performance of the plea bargain – that the State had no role 
in denying the defendant effective assistance of counsel, and that the defendant never actually accepted the offer – 
apply equally to each case.  In no case where a defendant rejects a plea bargain as a result of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, has the State been responsible for the deprivation. 
162 See, e.g., Wanatee v. Ault. 259 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2001) (ordering a new trial for habeas petitioner who was 
denied effective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining); United States v. Gordon, 156 F.3d 376, 382 (2d Cir. 
1998) (affirming district court’s order to vacate defendant’s convictions and grant him a new trial). 
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Most courts agree that a defendant suffers prejudice if, as a result of constitutionally 
deficient counsel, s/he rejects a plea bargain and proceeds to trial, only to receive a sentence 
much higher than the erroneously rejected plea bargain.  However, by and large, these decisions 
do not grapple with the difficulties in both determining prejudice and fashioning a remedy, two 
serious obstacles that were outlined in Part II.  The Greuber and Taccetta decisions concluded 
that since the machinations of the ensuing trial were fair, the defendant suffered no cognizable 
prejudice, and was therefore not entitled to a remedy.  
 
In response, I rebut two arguments deeply embedded in both decisions’ reasoning.  I first 
show that the right claimed is not the right to a plea bargain, but rather the procedural right to 
have effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations.  Second, I argue that preventing 
defendants from accepting a plea bargain if they have ever proclaimed innocence is an 
unworkable rule.  In Part IV-C, I introduce the notion that ineffective assistance of counsel 
during plea-bargaining is a “structural error,” rather than a trial error, and must be automatically 
reversed.  Even if the trial was otherwise “fair,” a structural flaw is inherently prejudicial 
because the error transcends the trial itself.  The test is not whether the trial alone was fair, but 
rather whether the defendant was fairly convicted, a question that includes more than just the 
trial itself.163   
After showing that a structural flaw will prejudice a defendant, despite any ostensibly 
“fair” trial s/he may have received, I conclude that the conviction should be vacated and the 
proceedings reset.  By vacating the convictions, but not forcing the prosecution to reoffer the 
plea, this remedy avoids entanglement with the principles of federalism or the separation of 
                                                 
163 State v. Lentowski, 569 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Wis.Ct.App. 1997). 
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powers, while still ensuring an outcome that protects both the defendant’s constitutional interests 
and also public’s interest in promoting justice. 
 
 
1- The Right Claimed Here Is Not the Right To a Plea Bargain, but Rather the 
Procedural Right to Be Effectively Represented During Plea Negotiations. 
 
One key argument, advanced by the Greuber court and others, is that defendants do not 
have a right to a plea-bargain, and therefore prejudice cannot result since the deficient counsel 
did not deprive the defendant of any substantive or procedural right to which the law entitles 
him.164  But this argument misstates the question. 
 
It is true that defendants do not have a constitutional right to a plea bargain, or even the 
right for the opportunity to negotiate for one.165  Nevertheless, in cases like these, the prosecution 
has already engaged in plea bargain negotiations with the defendant.  Therefore, the issue is not 
whether the criminal defendant has a right to engage in these negotiations, but rather once the 
negotiations start and an offer is made, whether a defendant has the right to be reasonably 
informed by effective counsel as to the direct consequences of either accepting or rejecting the 
prosecution’s offer.166  Put differently, the right lost here is not the right to a plea bargain as 
such, but rather the right to counsel’s assistance in making a decision after a plea bargain has 
already been put on the table.  To voluntarily reject a plea bargain, a defendant must understand 
the risks of proceeding to trial.167  
 
                                                 
164 Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). 
165 Greuber, 165 P.3d at 1190. 
166 See United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1992); People v. Curry, 687 N.E.2d 877, 887 (1997). 
167 In the Matter of McCready, 996 P.2d 658, 660 (Wash.App. 2000) (“Stated differently, Mr. McCready’s rejection 
of the plea offer was not voluntary because he did not understand the terms of the proffered plea bargain and the 
consequences of rejecting it.”) (emphasis in original).  See also People v. Correa, 485 N.E.2d 307 (1985) 
(voluntariness of guilty plea depends upon whether the defendant had effective assistance of counsel). 
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Although historically the core purpose of the right to counsel was to assure assistance at 
trial, over time the Court has recognized that this assistance would be less meaningful if it were 
limited to the formal trial itself.168  As a result, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the 
right to effective counsel attaches during all critical stages of the prosecution.169  In particular, 
the Court in Powell v. Alabama concluded that pretrial arrangements could be “perhaps the most 
critical period of the proceedings.”170  Since plea-bargaining is an “essential component”171 of 
the criminal process, a defendant’s counsel has a duty to provide effective assistance during this 
stage.172  This ensures that the defendant retains the ultimate authority to make certain 
fundamental decisions, such as whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own 
behalf, or take an appeal.173  When a defendant is denied effective assistance of counsel during 
plea bargaining, the right asserted is not the right to a plea bargain, or even the right to a fair 
trial, but rather the right to be properly informed before deciding his or her own fate.174  Once 
attached, this guarantee necessarily extends to the decision whether to accept or reject an 
offer.175  In this way, the right to counsel protects more than simply a fair trial, for it also “serves 
                                                 
168 United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309-10 (1973).  See also Nunes, 350 F.3d at 1052-53 (citing Powell and Ash 
to apply the Sixth Amendment to plea-bargain negotiations). 
169 See Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S.Ct. 2578 (2008); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57, (1932); Brewer v. 
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398, 9 (1977).  See also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) (applying the right “to 
ineffective-assistance claims arising out of the plea process”). 
170 Powell, 287 U.S. at 57. 
171 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971). 
172 Strickland 466 U.S. at 688. 
173 Nunes, 350 F.3d at 1053, quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, (1983). 
174 Id. (“Here the right that [the defendant] claims he lost was not the right to a fair trial or the right to a plea bargain, 
but the right to participate in the decision as to, and to decide, his own fate – a right also clearly found in Supreme 
Court law.”). 
175 Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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to protect the reliability of the entire trial process.”176  Therefore, incompetent advice to reject a 
plea-bargain offer and proceed to trial constitutes a cognizable Sixth Amendment violation.177 
 Indeed, the flaw in the Taccetta/Greuber approach becomes clear after one acknowledges 
that some constitutional protections have purposes other than to promote the reliability of guilty 
verdicts.  Before a court may fashion a remedy (or consider any remedy for that matter) to 
correct a constitutional violation, it should first assess the fundamental purposes of the right 
implicated by the error.178  In this case, the purpose of the right to effective assistance of counsel 
during plea-bargaining is to ensure that a defendant considers and understands the plea-bargain 
offer – and the consequences of rejecting or accepting its terms.  When this right is violated, 
returning the defendant to the moment before the violation occurred is the only way to vindicate 
the right’s basic purpose.  But since a court cannot order a member of the executive branch to re-
offer a plea-bargain, the only available vindication is a new trial.  The decisions in Taccetta and 
Greuber focus entirely on a reductionist view of the criminal process (a fair trial), while ignoring 
the essential purposes of this particular right.  
 
 
2- Disallowing defendants, who at one point or another may have declared their 
innocence, from later claiming they would have accepted a plea, is an unworkable 
rule. 
 
Recall that the Taccetta court used the defendant’s own proclamations of innocence 
against him, arguing that his plea would never have been approved since the defendant would 
                                                 
176 Id. at 1052.  See also United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1466 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Day, 969 
F.2d 39, 45 (3d Cir. 1992). 
177 Turner v. Tennessee, 858 F.2d 1201, 1205 (6th Cir. 1988).  Accord Johnson v. Duckworth, 793 F.2d 898, 900-02 
(7th Cir.) (criminal defendant has right to effective assistance of counsel when deciding whether to accept or reject a 
plea bargain offer), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 937 (1986); United States ex rel. Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435, 438 
(3d Cir. 1982) (“[The criminal defendant’s] decision to reject a plea bargain offer and plead not guilty is also a 
vitally important decision and a critical stage at which the right to effective assistance of counsel attaches.”); 
Beckham v. Wainwright, 639 F.2d 262, 267 (5th Cir. 1981) (defendant suffers a Sixth Amendment violation if 
advice to reject a plea bargain and proceed to trial is incompetent). 
178 Stacy & Dayton, supra note XX, at 89-90. 
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have committed perjury by pleading guilty.  Since a trial court cannot accept perjured testimony, 
the Taccetta court concluded that the defendant suffered no prejudice as a result of his lost 
plea.179  This rule, however, is inherently flawed.  To begin, it is circular: by pleading innocent 
and presenting a defense, the defendant could not have pled guilty and waived his defense.  But 
beyond that, it also misses the point.  The fact that a defendant chooses to defend himself after 
rejecting a favorable plea offer does not show why he rejected the offer in the first place.180 
 
While the Taccetta Court holds that a defendant cannot simultaneously maintain his 
innocence – or, for that matter, ever proclaim it – and plead guilty pursuant to a plea bargain, the 
Supreme Court thinks otherwise.  In fact, in North Carolina v. Alford, the Court said the exact 
opposite, holding that a trial judge may accept a guilty plea from a defendant who maintains his 
innocence, so long as there is “a strong factual basis” for the plea.181  While the Alford plea was 
accepted so that the defendant could avoid the risk of the death penalty, Alford-pleas for non-
capital offenses have also been accepted.182  Often, when a defendant believes that he is better 
served by pleading guilty rather than going to trial, there exists some factual basis for that plea.  
Even then, this is a question that is easily handled by the trial judge during an evidentiary 
hearing.  Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(3) only requires that “[b]efore entering 
judgment on a guilty plea, the court must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.”183 
                                                 
179 State v. Taccetta, 975 A.2d 928, 935-36 (N.J. 2009). 
180 See Lewandowski v. Makel, 949 F.2d 884, 889 (6th Cir. 1991) (determining prejudice rests on the defendant’s 
motivation for rejecting the plea offer, not the act itself); People v. Curry, 178 Ill.2d 509, 532 (1997) (same). 
181 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970). 
182 See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 923 F.2d 519, 524-26 (7th Cir.1991); United States v. Gomez-Gomez, 822 F.2d 
1008, 1011 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1028  (1988); United States v. O'Brien, 601 F.2d 1067, 1070 (9th 
Cir.1979); United States v. Bednarski, 445 F.2d 364, 365-66 (1st Cir.1971). 
183 Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3).  Additionally, the American Bar Association’s Criminal Justice Standards allow a plea 
to be withdrawn if it is necessary to correct a “manifest injustice.” Standard 14-2.1(b)(i) states, “Withdrawal may be 
necessary to correct a manifest injustice when the defendant proves, for example, that: (A) e defendant was denied 
the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by constitution, statute, or rule.”.  Am. Bar Ass’n, Criminal Justice 




A Taccetta-like rule is invariably unworkable because all too often defendants make 
claims of innocence that are vague, and rarely specific to the legal standards found in each 
charge.  For instance, if a defendant is indicted on murder and aggravated manslaughter, his 
proclamations of innocence may only refer to the murder charge.  But this is hardly surprising, 
since one may be innocent of murder and guilty of aggravated manslaughter.  Not allowing 
defendants to plea bargain if they have, at some point or another, professed their innocence, 
would destroy the plea-bargaining process itself.184 
 
If this rule is enforced, then only a defendant “who remains mute or, better yet, confesses 
in open court, will be able to complain of this constitutional violation.”185  But this reasoning 
forces a defendant to give up one constitutional right (the right to present a defense) to vindicate 
another (the right to counsel during plea bargaining).  Our constitutional rights cannot be held 
hostage in this fashion.186  A defendant who professes his innocence should not be firewalled 
from entering a plea pursuant to a plea bargain, especially if there exists a strong factual basis for 
guilt.187 
 
Ultimately, the internal logic of this rule depends on two assumptions: that the 
defendant’s professions of innocence are true, and that a guilty plea would be false (perjured) 
testimony.  This logic, however, does not survive analytical scrutiny because the trial itself, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Standards, Pleas of Guilty, Part II: Withdrawal of the Plea, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/guiltypleas_blk.html#2.1 [last visited: Apr. 3, 2010].  
 
184 See Mask v. McGinnis, 233 F 3d. 140 (2d Cir. 2000); Cullen v. United States, 194 F. 3d 401 (2d Cir. 1999); 
Pham v. United States, 317 F. 3d 178 (2d Cir. 2003). 
185 In re Alvernaz, 830 P.2d 747, 765 (9th Cir. 1992) (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
186 Id. 
187 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970); United States v. Cox, 923 F.2d 519, 524-26 (7th Cir.1991); 
United States v. Gomez-Gomez, 822 F.2d 1008, 1011 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1028  (1988); United 
States v. O'Brien, 601 F.2d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir.1979); United States v. Bednarski, 445 F.2d 364, 365-66 (1st 
Cir.1971).  See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3) (requiring a “factual basis for the plea”). 
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which ended with a conviction, should outweigh the defendant’s initial proclamations of 
innocence.  For example, the Taccetta court ignores the possibility that the professions of 
innocence themselves were perjured, rather than the hypothetical plea.  The fact that the 
defendant was convicted at trial lends support to the notion that his unsubstantiated and self-
serving claim of innocence ex ante was later disproved at trial.  If anything, given all the 
information revealed at trial, an appellate judge, ex post, should be more confident – not less –
that the guilty plea would not be perjured testimony.  After a trial and conviction, both 
assumptions listed above should hardly be taken for granted. 
 
Second, if a court were to accept these two assumptions, then it should immediately 
vacate the convictions and release the defendant.  For if the guilty plea would have been perjury, 
then a finding of guilt is surely erroneous.  Seen this way, the rule unfairly and unnecessarily 
favors the prosecution.  On the one hand, the government gets to stand by its original allegations.  
On the other hand, the defendant is not allowed to concede these allegations without committing 
perjury.  Those two conditions are untenable, not to mention contradictory. 
 
This argument, however, is related to the twin burdens many courts impose upon the 
defendant: (1) demonstrate that s/he would have accepted the offer, but for counsel’s advice;188 
and (2) show that the judge would have approved the offer.189  In the abstract, requiring the 
defendant to show that he would have accepted the offer is hardly unfair.  For instance, the 
Second Circuit has expressed doubt about whether a defendant’s self-serving, post-conviction 
testimony that he would have accepted the plea offer is sufficient, by itself, to establish a 
                                                 
188 In re Alvernaz, 830 P.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1992). 
189 People v. Stringham, 206 Cal.App.3d 184, 194 (1988). 
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“reasonable probability” that the outcome would have been different.190  The Seventh Circuit 
also requires other “objective evidence” that the defendant would have accepted the offer.191  
This requirement would reduce the risk of fabricated claims made by a self-serving party after 
trial.192   
However, while the burden of proving that the defendant would have accepted the offer is 
properly placed upon the defendant, the burden of demonstrating that the judge would have 
accepted the offer is not.  There is no statute and no Supreme Court cases that impose such a 
requirement.  Indeed, it appears rather unwise to require a litigant to demonstrate how a 
particular judge would have acted under past circumstances.193  Additionally, the burden here 
should be reversed.  Rather than obliging the defendant to prove that the judge would have 
accepted the offer, it is more appropriate to require the government to demonstrate that the trial 
court would not have approved of the plea arrangement, especially since disapproval is so rare.194  
In this way a prosecution may argue that, although a counsel’s ineffective assistance led to the 
rejection of a favorable plea offer, the defendant nevertheless suffered no prejudice because the 
trial court would not have approved the deal to begin with.195  Since courts so rarely reject plea-
bargains, after the defendant has demonstrated that he would have accepted the plea, the burden 
should then shift to the government to prove that the trial court was not prepared to approve the 
                                                 
190 United States v. Gordon, 156 F.3d 376, 381 (2d Cir. 1998); Boria v. Keane, 99 F.3d 492, 496-97 (2d Cir. 1996). 
191 Toro v. Fairman, 940 F.2d 1065, 1068 (7th Cir. 1991); Dias v. United States, 930 F.2d 832, 835 (11th Cir. 1991). 
192 In re Alvernaz, 830 P.2d 747, 756 (9th Cir. 1992). See also Turner v. Tennessee, 858 F.2d 1201, 1206 (6th Cir. 
1988) (“The State is correct in maintaining that Turner must establish that there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for the incompetence of counsel, he would have accepted the two-year offer and pled guilty.”). 
193 See Turner v. Tennessee, 858 F.2d 1201, 1207 (6th Cir. 1988) (“We know of no case or statute that imposes such 
a requirement, and we think it unfair and unwise to require a litigant to speculate as to how a particular judge would 
have acted under particular circumstances.”); United States ex rel. Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435, 438 n.2 (3d 
Cir. 1982) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel in decision to reject plea offer even though defendant did not 
rebut possibility that trial court would not have approved the arrangement). 
194 Commonwealth v. Napper, 254 Pa.Super. 54, 61 (1978). 
195 Turner v. Tennessee, 858 F.2d 1201, 1207-08 (6th Cir. 1988). 
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arrangement.196  For instance, in Turner the court found “much more significant” that the State 
could point to no evidence that indicated that the trial court would not have approved the plea 
arrangement.197  After the defendant established “a reasonable probability” that he would have 
accepted the State’s offer, the burdened shifted to the State to “offer clear and convincing 
evidence that the trial court would not have approved the plea arrangement.”198  Allocating the 
burdens in this way would be fairer to both parties. 
 
Some may argue that this arrangement unfairly burdens a prosecution that had no part in 
the constitutional violation.  However, as the Supreme Court said in Kimmelman v. Morrison, 
“[t]he Constitution constrains our ability to allocate as we see fit the cost of ineffective 
assistance.  The Sixth Amendment mandates that the State [or the government] bear the risk of 
constitutionally deficient assistance of counsel.”199  Therefore, placing too many of these burdens 




C- Ineffective assistance of counsel during plea-bargaining is a structural error in 
the trial process itself, which requires an automatic reversal and retrial. 
 
1. The Current Framework for Determining When an Error Is Structural or Trial 
 
Since the Constitution does not mandate any particular remedy for constitutional 
violations, courts are instead bound by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) to disregard 
any error “which does not affect substantial rights.”201  Congress enacted Rule 52(a) in 1919 so 
                                                 
196 Turner, 858 F.2d at 1207 (“We believe that, if the State wishes to suggest that the trial court would not have 
approved this plea arrangement, the State, and not Turner, bears the burden of persuasion.”). 
197 Turner, 858 F.2d at 1207. 
198 Id. 
199 477 U.S. 365, 379 (1986). 
200 See United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1469 (1994). 
201 28 U.S.C. § 2111.  See also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967). 
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that courts would not have to automatically reverse convictions because of small technical 
mistakes, which for all intents and purposes, did not affect the proceedings.202  The Supreme 
Court applied harmless-error review to constitutional errors for the first time in Chapman v. 
California.203  Writing for the Court, Justice Hugo Black summed up the purpose of the 
harmless-error standard:  “All of these rules, state or federal, serve a very useful purpose insofar 
as they block setting aside convictions for small errors or defects that have little, if any, 
likelihood of having changed the result of the trial.”204  The Court went on to clarify that “there 
may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and 
insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not 
requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction.”205 
 
However, the Chapman Court acknowledged that some constitutional rights are so 
fundamental that their infraction can never be harmless.206  The Court in 1967 listed three of 
these rights, taking care to emphasize that this list was not exhaustive: the right to counsel, the 
right to an impartial presiding judge, and the right to be free from a coerced confession.207  These 
errors are so intrinsic as to require automatic reversal without regard to their effect on the 
outcome.208  The Court has since expanded this “limited class of fundamental constitutional 
errors that defy analysis by harmless error standards.”209  For instance, the right to self-
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representation, when exercised, usually increases the likelihood of an outcome unfavorable to the 
defendant; therefore, any denial of this right is not amenable to harmless-error analysis.210   
 
When appellate courts confront errors in the lower court process, it must first decide 
whether to treat it as a structural error (which requires an automatic reversal) or a trial error 
(which might not always require reversal).211  To determine whether a particular constitutional 
error is a structural error or a trial error, courts use the test articulated in Arizona v. 
Fulminante.212  In Fulminante, the Arizona Supreme Court had ruled that the defendant’s 
confession had been coerced and that its use against him at trial violated the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States.213  The question before the Supreme Court was whether a 
lower court could subject the error to harmless-error analysis.  To resolve the issue, the 
Fulminante Court first articulated a dichotomy between trial errors and structural errors.  A trial 
error is one which “occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may 
therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to 
determine whether its [effect] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”214  As a result, trial 
errors are subject to harmless error analysis.  In contrast, an error is structural if, 
 
1. It does not occur during the presentation of the case to the jury; or 
2. Its effects on the verdict cannot be quantitatively assesses on appeal; or 
                                                 
210 McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177, n.8 (1984).  See also Martinez v. Court of Appeals, 528 U.S. 152, 160 
(2000) (the denial of self-representation is not subject to harmless error review because the right is “grounded in part 
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3. It affects the framework within which the trial proceeds, or whether it 
proceeds at all.215 
If an error meets any one of these standards, it is structural and the verdict must be 
vacated automatically.  Examples of structural errors, which are not subject to harmless-error 
analysis, include: denial of counsel;216 admitting a coerced confession;217 allowing an impartial 
judge to preside during trial;218 unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant’s race from a 
grand jury;219 unlawful denial of the right to self-representation at trial;220 denying one’s right to 
a public trial;221 selecting a petit jury in a discriminatory manner;222 and various jury selection 
errors in capital cases.223  The common thread connecting each of these errors is that they affect 
the framework within which the proceeds, impacting the prosecutorial process from beginning to 
end, and defying analysis by harmless-error standards.224 
 
In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, the Supreme Court added another error to this list.225  
In Gonzalez-Lopez the defendant’s counsel of choice was erroneously disqualified when the 
district court denied his motion for admission pro hac vice.  The Supreme Court had to decide 
whether to treat the erroneous deprivation of a defendant’s counsel of choice as a trial error or as 
a structural error.  The government asserted that a Sixth Amendment violation is not “complete” 
unless the defendant shows that the trial was unfair, which would require a showing of 
                                                 
215 Fulminante, 499, U.S. at 307-310. 
216 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
217 Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958). 
218 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). 
219 Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986). 
220 McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1986). 
221 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984). 
222 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1984). 
223 Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987). 
224 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310. 
225 548 U.S. 140 (2006). 
 Deal or No Deal?  Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Counsel during Plea Bargaining 
 
44
prejudice.226  Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia rejected this argument, stating that it reframes 
the Sixth Amendment “as a more detailed version of the Due Process Clause – and then proceeds 
to give no effect to the details.”227  Of course the right is designed to ensure a fair trial, but “it 
does not follow that the rights can be disregarded so long as the trial is, on the whole, fair.”228  
This reasoning “abstracts from the right to its purposes, and then eliminates the right.”229  The 
effects of wrongfully denying one’s chosen counsel are necessarily unquantifiable and 
intangible, making the inquiry especially speculative.230 
 
The Gonzalez-Lopez Court reasoned that since the right to select one’s counsel of choice 
is not derived from the Sixth Amendment’s purpose of ensuring a fair trial, it is unnecessary to 
conduct a prejudice inquiry.231  The Court concluded that this type of error is structural because 
it does not occur during trial, but before it; because it affects the trial from beginning to end; and 
because the impacts cannot be quantified.  Therefore, erroneously depriving a defendant of his 
counsel of choice is a “structural error,” not subject to harmless error review.232  When an error 
is deemed structural, no additional showing of prejudice is required. 
 
2. Applying the Fulminante Test to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel during Plea 
Bargaining  
 
It is evident from a comparison of trial errors and structural errors, that ineffective 
assistance of counsel during plea-bargaining is a structural error.  First, this error defies analysis 
by harmless-error standards, and affects the framework within which the trial proceeds, or 
whether it proceeds at all.  Second, and more tautologically, this type of error does not occur 
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during trial, and therefore cannot be a trial error.  Therefore, applying all three prongs of the 
Fulminante test, ineffective assistance of counsel during plea-bargaining should be considered a 
structural error, which warrants an automatic reversal. 
 
Similar to the erroneous deprivation of counsel of choice, ineffective assistance of 
counsel during plea-bargaining has “consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable and 
indeterminate.”233  It is impossible to know exactly what would have happened had the defendant 
received effective assistance of counsel: s/he might have accepted the offer; s/he might have 
made a counter-offer; s/he might have accepted the offer, but the judge might have rejected it 
and sent the parties back to the negotiating table; the defendant might have turned down the offer 
at first, gone to trial, but then signaled that s/he would accept the offer sometime during trial.  An 
inquiry into the effects of this error on the criminal process is endlessly speculative because its 
effect on the outcome is much more difficult to assess than either the complete denial of counsel 
or even denial of the defendant’s first-choice attorney.234   
 
Even more than the denial of one’s counsel of choice, this error affects “the framework 
within which the trial proceeds,”235 or “whether it proceeds at all.”236  If the defendant had 
received effective assistance of counsel while considering the plea bargain offer, s/he would have 
accepted the deal – meaning the trial would not have occurred in the first place.  In this way, the 
fact that the trial was conducted in a fair way misses the point.  No matter how “fair” the trial 
may have been on face, the fact that it never should have occurred means that the framework 
itself should be questioned, not the machinations within that framework.  Although Gonzalez-
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Lopez dealt with a different error altogether, the Court nevertheless acknowledged that errors 
during plea-bargaining would constitute structural flaws in the criminal process because the 
harmless-error analysis would be problematic and speculative: 
 
Many counseled decisions, including those involving plea bargains 
and cooperation with the government, do not even concern the 
conduct of the trial at all.  Harmless-error analysis in such a 
context would be a speculative inquiry into what might have 
occurred in an alternate universe.237 
 
Additionally, the Court’s recognition of the right to effective assistance of counsel goes 
beyond the “fair trial” context “to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results.”238  
These results necessarily include a comparison between the length of sentence and an 
erroneously rejected plea bargain.  Focusing only on the fairness of the trial when determining 
the impact of this error misses the forest for the trees.239  Ultimately, this error deprives the 
criminal defendant of basic protections, without which “no criminal punishment may be regarded 
as fundamentally fair.”240 
 
Finally, and rather tautologically, trial errors occur during the trial itself, but ineffective 
assistance of counsel during plea-bargaining necessarily occurs before the trial even begins, 
pervading the course and conduct of the trial from beginning to end.  Since trial error occurs 
during the presentation of the case to the jury, an appellate court can quantify its impact.241  For 
instance, the evidentiary impact of an involuntary confession, introduced to a jury during trial, is 
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subject to harmless error analysis because it can be quantified in light of other evidence. Thus, 
wrongfully admitting a coerced confession is not a structural error because it does not “transcend 
the criminal process,” or affect the framework within which the trial proceeds.242  In contrast, 
ineffective assistance of counsel during plea-bargaining does not occur during the presentation of 
the case to the jury.  This error is not subject to harmless-error analysis because once the 
defendant receives erroneous advice to reject the plea bargain offer “the entire conduct of the 
trial from beginning to end is obviously affected.”243  Analytically, subjecting this error to 
harmless-error standards is problematic because there is no object upon which the harmless-error 
scrutiny can operate.244  Harmless-error attaches to a discrepancy during trial to compare how the 
trial result would have changed had the error not occurred.  For this error, however, the object 
would be the existence of the trial itself.  The basis for harmless-error review is simply absent: it 
is illogical to assess the error’s effect on the verdict when the verdict should never have been 
rendered.245  These types of errors, which “infect the entire trial process,” must be automatically 
reversed.246   
 
 
3. The Taccetta and Greuber Decisions Adopt a Flawed Results-Oriented Approach 
 
To justify denying a defendant any remedy for this type of error, the Greuber and 
Taccetta courts rely upon the same argument that the government in Gonzalez-Lopez used 
unsuccessfully before the Supreme Court: namely, that a defendant must show how the pretrial 
error prejudiced the ensuing trial, which was otherwise fair.  Indeed, these two decisions 
demonstrate how problematic it is to apply harmless-error scrutiny to this type of error: on the 
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one hand, the trial itself was not mechanically unfair as a result of the error; on the other hand, 
the trial never should have occurred in the first place, since the defendant would have accepted 
the plea offer, but for the deficient counsel. 
 
Since this error is not amenable to harmless-error review, the Greuber and Taccetta 
courts are not applying a harmless-error test, but rather the “right result” test.  The underlying 
theme of both the Greuber and Taccetta decisions is that ineffective assistance of counsel during 
plea-bargaining did not render the defendant’s trial unfair because the proceedings ended in the 
“right result”: a obviously guilty person was found guilty by a jury and sentenced accordingly.  
Yet the same could be said of a directed verdict against a defendant with overwhelmingly 
unfavorable evidence mounted against him – but this error is per se reversible no matter what.247  
Results-oriented decisions like Greuber and Taccetta ignore the premise of structural-error 
review, which is that even convictions reflecting the “right result” must be reversed in order to 
protect a basic right.248  Indeed, our criminal process protects values other than the acquisition of 
guilty verdicts.249  For instance, in Tumey v. Ohio, the defendant was tried before a biased judge, 
but the State argued that this did not matter because the evidence clearly showed that he was 
guilty.250  The Court rejected this argument, stating clearly that “[n]o matter what the evidence 
was against him, the defendant had the right to an impartial judge.”251  Similarly, no matter how 
obvious the defendant’s guilty may be after an ostensibly “fair trial,” every criminal defendant 
has the right to effective assistance of counsel while considering the merits of a plea-bargain.   
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To apply harmless-error scrutiny to this error would diminish the significance of the 
constitutional violation and shift the emphasis from the fairness of the process to the correctness 
of the result.252  This “no harm, no foul” approach both underestimates the significance of the 
foul (the constitutional error), and ignores the consequences of the harm – so long as the “right 
result” was achieved.253   The “no remedy” option effectively denies that a constitutional 
violation even occurred, for if the court does not remedy the error, for all practical purposes it 
did not occur.254  But this approach would abrogate the right to counsel during plea-bargaining, 
because so long as a defendant is given a fair trial afterwards, any error that occurred beforehand 
may be “deleted” because the score is reset once the trial begins.  This reductionist notion of 
what a fair trial means is entirely too myopic: if a constitutional error occurs, but the defendant is 
still given a fair trial, judicial efficiency and finality justify upholding the conviction.255  
 
 It is clear that the argument against retrial is invariably wrapped in pragmatism: why retry 
a defendant who is obviously guilty?  Trials are expensive, time-consuming, and unpredictable.  
But our criminal justice system should not ignore basic violations of constitutional rights simply 
for convenience’s sake. William Blackstone cautioned against this very mentality, 
 
[H]owever convenient [ignoring ineffective assistance of counsel 
during plea-bargaining] may appear at first, (as, doubtless, all 
arbitrary powers, well executed, are the most convenient,) yet let it 
be again remembered that delays and little inconveniences in the 
forms of justice are the price that all free nations must pay for their 
liberty in more substantial matters; that these inroads upon this 
sacred bulwark of the nation are fundamentally opposite to the 
spirit of our constitution; and that, though begun in trifles, the 
precedent may gradually increase and spread to the utter disuse of 
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[counseled decisions] in questions of the most momentous 
concern.256 
 
  Instead of applying harmless-error analysis, courts should first ask whether this type of 
error is even amenable to harmless-error analysis.  But like the violation in Gonzalez-Lopez, a 
Sixth Amendment violation during plea-bargaining is not amenable to harmless-error analysis 
because it is a structural error in the criminal process. 
 
Yet even if an appellate court were to apply the harmless-error test to this violation, 
Chapman v. California made clear that the category of “harmless” errors is narrow: only those 
errors which are so “unimportant and insignificant” that they had no impact on the outcome of 
the proceedings are “harmless.”257  But it stretches credulity to label an error that caused a 
defendant to reject a favorable plea-bargain and receive a much higher sentence, “unimportant 
and insignificant.”  Even under an analytically re-worked harmless-error test, these cases must be 
reversed because the defendant clearly suffers some error: a higher sentence than s/he normally 
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The remedy for this type of constitutional violation is neither simple nor intuitive.  Many 
courts have questioned the wisdom of ordering a new trial, since it appears redundant and 
disproportional.  In a perfect world, the clock would be reset to the very moment the 
constitutional deprivation occurred, so that the defendant could accept the plea bargain.  
However, changed circumstances often make this remedy impossible to resurrect, while other 
judicial constraints caution against its use. 
 
Like many other structural errors, resetting the adjudicative process by ordering a retrial 
can actually cure this defect.  For instance, the right to represent oneself does not serve the 
purpose of ensuring a fair trial; rather, it serves to protect a defendant’s dignity and 
independence.258  If a trial court denies a defendant this right, ordering a retrial to allow him to 
defend himself – although costly and repetitive – would vindicate the purposes underlying this 
right.  Similarly, if a trial court wrongfully deprives a defendant of her counsel of choice, 
ordering a retrial so that the defendant’s chosen attorney may represent her, cures this error.259  
In both cases, the amount of evidence, or the fact that the trial was otherwise fair, does not 
negate the fact that the right’s purposes were frustrated by the constitutional violations.  
Similarly, the purpose of the right to effective assistance of counsel during plea-bargaining is to 
ensure that a criminal defendant understands the consequences of accepting or rejecting a plea-
bargain.  Resetting the adjudicative process, while providing the defendant with adequate 
counsel, vindicates this right by returning the defendant to his pre-trial position.  But since a 
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court cannot order a member of the executive branch to reoffer the plea bargain, a retrial isn’t 
just the best solution – it’s the only solution. 
 
The argument that a defendant who receives a fair trial is not prejudiced by ineffective 
assistance of counsel is powerful, but ultimately myopic, and too results-oriented.  Its proponents 
focus solely on the fairness of the trial’s machinations, and not on the fairness of the framework 
within which the trial proceeded. This approach erroneously equates “fair process” with “correct 
result.”  However, the question is not whether the events during trial were fair – that is, the 
events between opening argument and closing argument – but whether the defendant was 
adequately counseled in the decision to go to trial or not.  A trial-error necessarily occurs during 
trial; in contrast, a structural error often occurs before the trial begins, affecting the course of the 
trial from beginning to end.  In this way the flawed process is not unlike a trial before a biased 
judge or the absence of counsel: in each case the defendant is denied a right that casts the entire 
process as fundamentally flawed.260  No matter how “fair” the internal machinations of the 
ensuing trial may have been, the constitutional deficiency already poisoned the well of the 
criminal process.    
 
Only by resetting that process by ordering a new trial can a court adequately balance 
competing constitutional interests while still remedying a clear constitutional violation. 
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